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Abstract 
The DAC countries have for a long time been practically the only large donors of 
international aid. However, China has become increasingly influential the last 
decade.   
This study is aimed at investigating how aid from the DAC countries has 
changed when Chinese aid has increased. Aid aimed at promoting democracy, 
corruption, governance, and human rights is investigated since these sectors 
present a clear difference in Chinese and DAC aid policies. The thesis also offers 
an explanation to this policy change through aid theory.  
It is concluded that DAC countries have somewhat increased aid towards 
democracy, corruption, governance and human rights in the region of Africa 
South of Sahara. This is explained by both a concern about Chinese aid being a 
negative influence, but also that it is a way of the traditional donors to keep its 
influence by investing in a sector where China explicitly states they will not 
interfere.  
Zambia is presented as an illustrative example which supports the conclusions 
reached in the first section. It is also found that new donors give aid recipients a 
new possibility to negotiate with donors, meaning the DAC countries are risk 
losing influence, not to China, but to their development partners.  
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1 Introduction 
For most of modern history a small group of rich, Western, countries have 
dominated the aid sector. Money has been flowing from the global north to 
the south with outspoken goals of poverty reduction, humanitarian aid and 
democracy building. However, the world is changing, and a growing share 
of the world‟s aid comes from developing countries where the BRIC, Brazil, 
India, Russia, and China, are in the lead. These countries still receive aid 
from traditional donors, but have set out to start their own aid programs. 
Programs often criticised for ignoring democracy building, good 
governance, and anti-corruption work, whilst promoting economic growth 
benefiting domestic companies. However, the motifs of these new donors do 
not necessarily differ substantially from the actual goals of traditional 
donors. Nonetheless, there are many differing factors between the two 
groups of donors, which intuitively should change the way old donors work 
when new donors increase their aid. This is what will be investigated 
throughout this these.  
1.1 Methodology 
The general aim of this thesis is to shed some light on one the changing 
global dynamics of aid, and how this is affecting donor behaviour. To do 
this the question of research is defined as:  
 
Has the increased aid from China to Africa South of Sahara 
had an effect on DAC-donors aid regarding democracy, 
human rights, good governance,
1
 and anti-corruption? Why? 
 
These specific areas of aid are of particular interest since a common critique 
towards China is that they are neglecting, or having a negative impact on 
these areas. This makes it interesting to investigate how traditional donors 
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 Good governance here means processes of decision making and implementing are; participatory, 
consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and 
inclusive and follows the rule of law. (UNESCAP)  
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react to an increase in Chinese aid. If aid directed to these areas has 
increased when Chinese aid has also increased, it can be taken as a sign of 
traditional donors complementing Chinese aid, and if it wards decreases it is 
seen as a sign that it is becoming more similar to Chinese-style aid.  
This is a descriptive and, to some extent, explanatory study. The aim is 
to see how DAC countries work has changed; from the time where Chinese 
aid constituted a very small share of Africa‟s aid donation, up until today 
where they are a more significant actor in the region. This is done in order to 
find a difference in the way DAC gives aid that can have been affected by 
China. It is also interesting to see whether or not DAC has reacted on this 
presumed change in the aid environment, and if they have moved towards 
filling the gaps that Chinese aid supposedly leaves. This means the direct 
causality problem becomes less important in the study.  
This thesis is also a case study, which has the benefit that it allows us to 
more map the causes and effects on one specific case, but it also makes 
generalisations more problematic as no comparisons are made, and it is 
possible that the examined case is an outlier (Teorell & Svensson, 
2012:226ff). 
The focal point in time lies between the year of 2000 up until today. 
Development cooperation between China and Africa intensified after the 
Sino African forum in 2000 and this can therefore be seen as a sort of 
breakpoint for Chinese involvement in Africa (Mahmoud,2007:115). The 
year 2000 is also one year before China joined the WTO, which can be seen 
a crucial step towards Chinese integration on the world‟s economy and 
politics (Hoekman-Kostecki, 2009:568). As shown in later chapters Chinese 
aid to the region south of Sahara also increased significantly around the year 
2000. Unfortunately though, DAC only keep detailed statistics of aid by 
sector, year, and recipient country from 2002, which is why some of the 
analysis will start from then.   
Chinese aid´s effect on traditional donor behaviour in Africa has 
received a lot of attention from journalists. It has received a lot less so from 
researchers, meaning this study can aspire to fill a gap in the academia. 
Furthermore, the focal point of the thesis is on the “supply side” of aid, 
which has long been somewhat neglected, but is now receiving increased 
attention from both academia and journalist (Samuel Jones, 2012:125).  This 
makes the study relevant both within and outside of the academia. 
In order to explain DAC countries donor behavior, a theoretical 
framework of why countries give aid is presented. The topic of 
investigation, how and why traditional donors react to increased aid from 
China, is a case of what and how external factors affect aid donors. In order 
to explain these effects, it is necessary to first examine what causes change. 
In this case, countries can be expected to react differently to the rise of a 
new type of donor depending on why they give aid in the first place. 
Therefore, theories about why countries give aid will serve as a starting 
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point for the theoretical discussion. Since governance, democracy, human 
rights, and anti-corruption often are highlighted by traditional donors, it is 
interesting to see if these areas receive more or less attention when a new 
aid donor enters the stage. The theory then serves as a tool to explain these 
changes. This means the study is of a theory consuming character.  
In order to analyse the dynamics of aid in Africa in further detail, the 
illustrative case of Zambia is examined. A single country allows us to look 
at more country specific explanation factors which hopefully yields a deeper 
understanding of the subject.  
1.1.1 Choice of Cases 
China is analysed as it is the fastest growing and, in some ways, the 
most controversial “new” donor. The only non-democratic BRIC country 
gives billions of dollars in aid and strongly promotes Chinese investment in 
poorer countries. Further, Chinese aid is very opaque, making China a very 
difficult, albeit interesting country to study. It is not a typical case of south-
south cooperation, but it definitely is one of the most important ones.  
The DAC
2
 is a forum for policy discussion on aid, but does not give aid. 
Its member countries do give aid, and they agree on certain policies which 
affects members´ national aid policies. These countries, together, donate a 
clear majority of the world‟s aid. (Woods, 2008: 1205). This makes them a 
good representation of the traditional donors that have given the most aid in 
modern history (Tan-Mullins et.al. 2010, 858).  It is somewhat problematic 
drawing far reaching conclusions about such a diverse group of countries, 
and they are affected very differently by economic and political events 
(Jones, 2012:126). However, since they have outspoken, collective goals 
and collaborate in so many ways, it is still possible to make conclusions of 
trends, and to see how the organization in itself is changing.  
As for recipients of aid, Africa and the region South of Sahara receives 
the largest part of the world´s aid making this a very an important region to 
investigate (Aidflows, 2013). This region is examined in this thesis on a 
general level, and Zambia is then used as an illustrative example as it is one 
of the top receivers of Chinese aid. It is a country heavily dependent on aid 
but with rich natural resources. This and the lack of conflict in the area 
                                                                                                                                      
 
2
 The member countries of DAC are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States and The 
European Union. Iceland became a member in March of 2013 and will not be included as a 
member of the DAC as they have not been a member during the relevant period, they are however 
still represented as the EU is present in DAC (OECD
1
)   
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makes it a favourable case to examine, as all these factors seem to pave the 
way for a reaction from DAC donors in some way.  
1.1.2 Concepts and definitions 
The definition of aid is highly debated and there is no consensus between 
DAC and China what sort of activities can be named aid. Generally, aid is 
defined as a transfer of capital from one country to another, with a non-
commercial objective, and including some concessional terms (Todaro-
Smith,  2011: 670). DAC uses ODA, Official Development Assistance, as a 
means of defining what aid is. ODA are “Flows of official financing 
administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare 
of developing countries as the main objective and which are concessional
3
 
in character with a grant element of at least 25 per cent”(Bräutigam, 
2011:756). To be marked ODA, aid has to be directed to a developing 
country, or to a multilateral agency that is undertaken by the official sector 
in such a country. Technical co-operation is included in the DAC definition 
along with bilateral ODA, grants and concessional and non-concessional 
development lending by multilateral financial institutions. However, grants 
and loans for military purposes are not included, neither are export credits or 
transfers to private individuals (OECD
2
). Both bilateral and multilateral aid 
is investigated, and DAC aid is measured as the aggregate ODA flows from 
all member countries.  
China rejects this DAC definition of aid, even though aid from China 
and DAC has a number of similarities. However, unlike DAC, China does 
not make a distinction between what would be called ODA, and economic 
cooperation or investment if it is intended to “build local capacity of the 
recipient countries” (Tan-Mullins et.al. 2010: 862). Furthermore, China 
defines aid by financial flows being concessional, including grants, zero 
interest loans and concessional loans in the definition (Bräutigam, 
2011:753ff).  
The discrepancy in definitions does not pose as such a large reliability 
problem as it may seem as the aim of this thesis is not to compare the 
donors. Instead, the effect of one on the other is investigated, so aid will 
simply be defined for DAC as DAC defines it and for China as China 
defines it. This distinction between DAC and Chinese definitions mirrors a 
highly politicized aid discussion. The DAC have for a long time had 
monopoly on saying what aid is, but this is questioned and discussed as new 
donors enter the aid scene with a somewhat different philosophy as to what 
                                                                                                                                      
 
3
 Concessional terms: Terms for a loan that is more favorable to the borrower than for loans 
available through standard financial markets  (Todaro-Smith, 2011:698). 
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aid is. This discussion is avoided by allowing each actor to define aid for 
themselves.  
1.1.3 Disposition 
The introductory chapter is followed by a theoretical discussion about the 
motivations behind aid. An outline of Chinese aid to Africa is drawn, to be 
followed by an overview of DAC aid and its development in Africa. This is 
analysed and summarised to be further examined in the chapter dedicated to 
Zambia. In the last and final chapter a short summary of the findings is 
presented alongside with the conclusion.  
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2 Theoretic Framework 
The motivation behind developing aid varies between donors, and is a 
contested topic within the research community. Most commonly, countries 
themselves claim that aid is given out of solidarity and altruism, the goal 
being promoting economic development and welfare for the recipient 
(Mahmoud, 2007:48). However, when researchers look at what actually 
guides countries´ aid allocation, a different image emerges. It seems like 
countries give aid to boost their own economic growth, or simply to gain 
international power by increasing influence abroad. These contradictory 
explanations are presented below along with a short description as to how 
they would apply on the case of DAC-donors.  
2.1 Why Countries Give Aid 
In 1993 David Halloran Lumsdaine argued that countries essentially give 
aid because it is moral to do so. He showed how several DAC countries 
moved away from using aid as leverage in donor-recipient relationships, 
instead giving more aid to the poorest countries whilst decreasing 
conditionalities. Lumsdaine concludes that humanitarian and egalitarian 
principles are what actually motivate countries to give aid. (Hodgen 
Thomson, 1995:242f). 
Despite being a vivid part of donors´ rhetoric‟s, Lumsdains theories are 
very rarely advocated by researchers (Collier and Dollar, 2001:2). Instead, a 
much more accepted notion is that countries primarily give aid because it is 
within their political or economic self-interest to do so (Todaro, 2011:700). 
David Dollar and Alberto Alesina claims that aid is mostly allocated to 
countries where donors have strong economic or political interests. This can 
mean donor countries donate to their former colonies, as in the case of 
France, or to allies, as in the case of the US.  
As for economic motivations to aid, it can be understood as a way for 
donor countries to promote national companies or expand export markets by 
boosting foreign economy. Furthermore, loans, albeit concessional, are not 
grants. They are ultimately a source of income for donor countries. Poor 
countries may not be able to loan to market rates, and concessional loans are 
therefore an important source of capital to be used for development. 
However, donor countries still make a profit of these loans as developing 
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countries pay interest. Aid can also be tied, or concessional, e.g. making 
recipients liberalize import markets which makes it easier for donor country 
firms to compete there (Todaro-Smith. 2011:701ff). On occasion, aid even 
ends up in the pockets of donor countries firms, studies shows that up to 
80% of US aid ultimately went to US companies (Mahmoud, 2007:56). 
Political strategies may be just as important as economical ones 
(Todaro,2011:701). This school of thought can be exemplified by the aid 
situation during the cold war, where large countries, very clearly used aid as 
an instrument of political power. The US and Soviet both “bought” recipient 
countries´ loyalties with aid money, securing prime materials as well as 
military allies (Odén, 2006: 141). Dag Ehrenpreis states that the fall of the 
Berlin wall made it more difficult for the OECD countries to motivate aid to 
poor countries as their loyalty no longer needed to be secured by aid, 
showing how important these political motivators of aid are (1994:19). 
2.2 Self-interest and Aid 
Even if countries primarily give aid to serve their own interest it can still be 
justified to focus aid on non-economic sectors, such as democracy, 
governance, human rights and anti-corruption. 
To have any of the desired effects of aid, it needs to be effective, 
otherwise it is difficult to gain loyalties or promote domestic economic 
interests. Good governance is generally considered to increase the chances 
for aid to be efficient (Collier - Dollar, 2001:1798ff). Dollar and Burnside 
(1997) even argues aid is beneficial for countries that adapt appropriate and 
stable policies, and if they do not, the aid is wasted. A high level of 
democracy makes it more probable that the poor can influence, and take part 
of, the inflow of investment from abroad. The state also plays a crucial role 
in making private sector growth possible by keeping a macroeconomic 
balance and by protecting private ownership and rule of law (Ehrenpreis, 
1995:22). Furthermore, corruption undermines efficient and accountable 
institutions, and holds back economic growth, but it also divert resources 
away from projects and activities that reduce poverty (OECD
8
, 2012:1). 
Further, corruption means donors cannot trust that their money is coming to 
good use, meaning they feel they have to increase control over aid, which in 
turn makes aid less effective. Therefore, anti-corruption work is an 
important part of making aid effective (OECD
7, 
2006:8). This implies that 
promoting good governance not only is a way for western countries to 
spread norms and make developing countries adapt to their policies, but also 
is an important step towards economic growth and a more equal distribution 
of assets.  
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However, democracy, human rights, and anti-corruption must be 
weighed against recipient countries right to self-determination. It is no 
longer acceptable for rich countries to dictate how aid recipients should 
handle their internal affairs. Further, numerous studies have shown how 
untied aid is far more efficient than conditional aid. (Todaro – Smith, 
2011:646). This balance between a desire to respect the right of self-
determination, norm spreading and need for instant poverty release is 
reflected in how countries allocate aid. To make matters even more 
complex, trade and the private sector are key forces for economic growth 
and development, meaning they should also receive a share of the collected 
aid (Ehrenpreis, 1995:22). Hence, aid to private sector and trade promotion 
and donor and recipients can be good for the recipient, and does not 
necessarily suggest purely selfish donor-motifs.  
Furthermore, the claim that harmonized aid is more efficient aid can 
support the notion that growing Chinese aid should have som impact on 
DAC aid. According to the DAC, donors should work together and 
complement each other in order to be more efficient.  
Looking at aid from a realist perspective, where countries act in self-
interest, democratic aid can be justified as a way to increase influence. By 
giving aid to strengthen democracy, you also get an indirect influence over 
the democratic system. Parallel to how economic aid give economic 
influence, political aid gives political influence (Dunne and Schmidt, 
2008:93). Further, if countries perceive that China is playing an increasing 
role in the field of economic aid, democratic aid can be a way of growing 
influence in the region.   
Regardless of whether the motif for aid is selfish, it still needs to be 
efficient to yield these desired results. This could mean it is in a country´s 
best interest to promote human rights, good governance, democracy, and 
anti-corruption in a recipient country as it both promotes a better long time 
trade climate, but also gives the donor increased possibilities to affect its 
national policy through international democratic institutions.  
2.3 Hypothesis 
This thesis not directly aimed at investigating why countries give aid, but 
rather what changes the pattern of aid donation by sectors. However, the two 
are closely related. If countries give aid because of strategic reasons, 
changes in their political or economic sphere will probably cause a change 
in aid allocation. In the continuation of this thesis, aid focused on 
democracy, anti-corruption, or human rights, will be investigated as it is a 
category of aid that clearly sets the DAC donors apart from Chinese aid. If 
Chinese aid is working to disrupt development within these areas, or at least 
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is ignored by Chinese aid, it is expected that DAC countries would put a 
larger focus on aid directed towards these areas. Even though work on 
human rights and anti-corruption risks to cause friction with recipient 
countries, these areas poses as an opportunity for traditional donors to gain 
political influence. Also, in the light of aid effectiveness, as is discussed in 
later chapters, if China is a disruptive force in terms of good governance, 
DAC countries would have to raise focus on that in order to counterbalance 
the Chinese influence.  
The continuation of this study is dedicated to investigating more closely 
at why China can be expected to affect DAC countries work, in order to 
draw a conclusion on whether this change has occurred or not.  
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3 Chinese aid 
The last decade has been a dynamic one, with an increasing Chinese 
influence and economic crises in most of the DAC-countries. The following 
chapter is aimed at showing what Chinese aid looks like in order to give an 
analysis of how this may have affected traditional donors. 
3.1 Chinese Aid Characteristics 
In recent years South-South cooperation has increased dramatically, and 
China is the most prominent of these southern donors. (Mahmoud, 2007:2). 
However, cooperation between developing countries is not a new 
phenomenon, and Chinese aid dates back to the 1950´s (Mahmoud, 
2007:85ff). As early as the 1980´s, Deng Xiaoping formulated a principle of 
mutual benefit between them as donors and the recipients of their aid. Until 
relatively recently, Chinese aid was focused on a few resource rich countries 
like Algeria and Nigeria, but has now expanded to almost all African 
countries (The Economist, 2013). 
  Chinese aid is generally more pragmatic than traditional donor aid. It 
generally focuses on immediate issues such as health care, agriculture, 
education, energy issues, and trade
4
 (UN
1
, 2013). Chinese aid also has a 
very strong policy of non-interference, which contrasts to the relatively high 
amount of tied aid from DAC donors. (Mahmoud, 2007:83ff). An expression 
of this policy of non-interference was the initiation of the Forum on China-
African Cooperation (FOCAC), where Chinese and African leaders met to 
draw directions for a deepening collaboration. The conference was aimed at 
promoting “equal negotiations, enhancing understanding, increasing 
consensus, strengthening friendship and promoting cooperation”. 
Connections between Chinese and African leaders have intensified at all 
levels following the conference (Mahmoud 2007:118f). However, China´s 
policy of non-interference also means they tend to ignore issues central in 
traditional Western aid, such as democracy, gender, participation, and the 
                                                                                                                                      
 
4 
An example of this are the 100 schools, 30 hospitals, 30 anti-malaria centers and 20 
agricultural technology demonstration centers that was announced to be built with Chinese 
help 2012 at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (UN
1
, 2013). 
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environment, which are more central issues amongst traditional donors 
(Mahmoud, 2007:83ff). 
China offers all developing countries, with which they have diplomatic 
relations, some sort of grant or zero-interest loans. Eximbank, the Chinese 
export credit agency, offers concessional foreign aid loans to credit worthy 
countries or bankable projects
5
 to less creditworthy countries (Bräutigam, 
2009: 277–281). Chinese descriptions of their concessional loans emphasize 
the similarities with ODA. The objective of these loans is to „promote 
economic development and improve living standards in developing 
countries,‟ and to „boost economic cooperation between developing 
countries and China.‟ These projects are also supposed to have social 
benefits (Bräutigam, 2009: 27ff). Further, China includes military aid and 
loans to support Chinese joint venture investments in their external 
assistance, something that would not qualify as ODA.  
China competing in the trade sector with relatively low salaries, are also 
very competitive in the aid sector. In West Africa, for example, it is not 
uncommon to find western water engineers that cost nine times that of a 
Chinese water engineer (Mahmoud, 2007: 83). This means recipients can 
buy more with the aid and concessional loans they receive from China.  
3.1.1 The Size of Chinese Aid 
Chinese aid is very opaque, and there is generally a lot of confusion between 
what is an actual aid project, an on-going negotiation, or even pure 
investments, which makes it problematic to make a reliable estimation of 
the size of Chinese aid (Bräutigam, 2013). Numbers mentioned by 
researchers and governments vary a great deal, therefore, all numbers 
mentioned here should be taken with caution. 
In 2005 aid from China was estimated to make up between 1.5% to 8% 
of total ODA offered by DAC members (Lee, 2012:978). The relatively 
new, and somewhat contested, database Aid Data claims China has directed 
about 75 billion to Africa in development financing. According to 
researcher Deborah Bräutigam is a vastly overstated number as she points to 
numerous errors in the data collection where discussions about deals are 
filed as actual aid donation and some cases where the actual transfer of 
funds were about a hundredth of the amount filed in the database (Aid data; 
Bräutigam 2013). According to my own estimates of the Aid Data database,  
Chinese ODA like commitments to Africa South of Sahara amounts to 5,7  
billion USD between 2000 and 2011 (which is about half of the calculated 
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 Bankable project = a project that lenders are willing to finance because it has a positive outlook 
(www.eib.org) 
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ODA like commitments made by China). This can be compared to total 
DAC ODA that amounts to 264 billion USD since 2002 (OECD
4
). 
However, considering how many of the sources are considered unreliable 
(by Aid Data themselves) and the heavy critique of the database, these 
numbers should be taken with a large pinch of salt.  
Chinese aid is sometimes difficult to separate from FDI, and the two are 
often somehow connected. Africa South of Sahara is also a relatively 
popular destination for Chinese FDI. In 2010, Chen Deming said Chinese 
FDI to Africa was 14.7 billion, but at the same time a Chinese ambassador 
in South Africa claimed that it was more than 40 billion. (Economist, 2011
2
) 
Acclaimed researcher Deborah Bräutigam reports on official Chinese 
figures of trade with Africa as a whole for somewhere around 16 billion 
USD for 2012, which she judges is a slight underestimation (Bräutigham, 
2013
2
).  
Despite the lack of reliable numbers, there is a consensus that Chinese 
aid has increased since the turn of the millennia, and that, today, China is an 
important power in Africa.  
3.1.2 China as a Development Partner 
There is a large recent debate on whether Chinese aid is beneficial for 
African countries. There is a, predominately Western, concern about if 
Chinas policy of non-interference undermines Western efforts to promote 
political and economic reform (Negi, 2008). Not everyone agrees though. 
The Economist claims that African democracy has not been damaged by 
Chinese presence, and the Chinese governments´ lack of concern about 
human rights abuses or democratic development has not, per se, undermined 
democratic institutions. The fact that the Chinese government has given 
support to both dictators and their opposition supports this argument 
(Economist, 2013). Furthermore, Chinese involvement in the region means 
a much-needed influx of investment which helps boost economic 
development.  
Official conditionalities in the shape of institutional reform or 
democratization, are absent in the case of Chinese aid, but there are 
sometimes economic conditionalities tied to the development assistance. 
There have, for example, been reports of Chinese demands of hiring only 
Chinese labour in development projects in Angola and Ghana. However, in 
numerous cases almost exclusively locals are being hired (Tan-Mullins et. 
al, 2010:876). The Economist reports that most of Chinese aid is given 
under the condition that recipients spends their aid buying goods and 
services from Chinese companies (Economist, 2011
2
). This however, is far 
from an exclusive Chinese practice; it is very common amongst all donors, 
traditional as well as new ones. 
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It is also frequently discussed whether China is taking advantage of 
African countries, by securing access to prime materials whilst drowning the 
African market in cheap goods, harming domestic production. This 
particular issue is reoccurring in the critique of Chinese aid, as a lot of the 
Chinese aid is somehow trade related (Tan-Mullins et al. 2010:857ff).  
There is also a concern coming from Western scholars and policymakers 
about corruption trailing behind Chinese aid (Bräutigham, 2010:15). 
Transparency International places Kina as the second worst bribe payer 
when investing abroad, out of the 28 biggest economies in the world. 
However, China passed a law in 2011 making it illegal for Chinese 
companies to pay bribes abroad, which, albeit somewhat late, can be seen as 
China taking steps towards accountability abroad (Transparency
2
, 2011). 
This does not mean that the Chinese state itself pays bribes, but by so 
intensively promoting domestic companies in Africa it may also implicitly 
introduce new corrupted actors on the continent. 
In short, Chinese aid has a lot in common with traditional aid as it may 
seem at a first glance. A lot of good is done thanks to Chinese development 
assistance. However, the lack of interest in democracy, human rights and 
functioning governmental institutions is evident, and illustrates a difference 
in focus from traditional donors.  
3.2 China´s Effect on DAC 
Apart from the fact that China does not contribute to traditional donors work 
on democracy and governance, why would DAC countries adapt their 
policies because of China´s aid? Well, not only does China have a different 
focal point in aid, but there also seems to be a concern of a power shift, from 
the North, to the South.  
There is a widespread, mainly Western, concern about China‟s growing 
international role in politics and economics. This concern is particularly 
high in regards to Africa. Media, NGOs, researchers, and governments send 
out warnings about how China‟s impact in Africa is negative (Mahmoud, 
2007:120). British Prime Minister David Cameron has named Chinas 
increased presence in Africa as an “invasion” that harms stability, 
investment, and growth (Daily Mail, 2011). Hilary Clinton also stated that 
China may be neo-colonialist as they do not always meet international 
standards of transparency and good governance when it comes to aid 
(Hairong-Sautman, 2013:132). Clinton also stated, in 2012, that “America 
will stand up for democracy and universal human rights even when it might 
be easier to look the other way and keep the resources flowing”. This, 
however, is only one example of US critique of China taking advantage of 
African countries whilst ignoring democratic development (The Guardian, 
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2012). Critique of Chinese aid often touches on Chinas lack of respect for 
human rights, democracy, and the type of good governance standards 
traditional donors promote (Mahmoud, 2007: 120 – UN2). As leaders of 
prominent DAC donors are reacting like this there are reasons to expect they 
would change their aid policies. 
It is not only politicians that stay weary of Chinese involvement in 
Africa. Moisés Naím, at the time editor in chief of Foreign Policy, writes 
about “toxic aid” from China. Naím claims Chinese aid is undermining 
traditional donors work by its competitive, non-conditional aid. He goes as 
far as calling it harmful, non-democratic, and corruption fostering 
(2007:96). This is also part of a general trend where the focus of Western 
scholars have moved focus; from the political motivations of Chinese aid in 
Africa, to economic motivators (Mahmoud, 2007:110). 
Not all critique of China is valid, and much of it is based on 
misconceptions. For example, researchers like Deborah Bräutigam, claim 
that there is no evidence of the Chinese practice to use official foreign 
assistance budget to gain access natural resources (Bräutigam, 2009: 277–
281). Also, when accusing China of being a harmful donor as they 
collaborate with undemocratic regimes, one might want to keep in mind that 
the biggest lenders to said regimes still are Western commercial banks. The 
US and Europe are continuously selling large volumes of weapons to 
autocracies in Africa, making them just as bad, or worse than their Chinese 
counterpart (Hairong-Sautman, 2013:133).  
It is not entirely clear what the effect of Chinese aid is, but it is clear 
that it does have an impact on Africa, which means DAC countries can be 
expected to react in some way. Either to counterweight this seemingly 
harmful type of aid to ensure that good governance practice is not forgotten 
in African countries, or to compete with Chinese aid to make sure political 
or economic influence is not lost.  
Also, as mentioned in the theoretic part of the thesis, resources are 
sometimes a driving part of development collaborations. For DAC 
countries, the entrance of China on the world market as well as on the aid 
scene is therefore a cause of concern. Increased Chinese influence may 
cause competition between the West and China. As Michael Battle, US 
ambassador to the African Union said: “if we don‟t invest on the African 
continent now, we will find China and India have absorbed its resources 
without us” (Hairong-Sautman, 2013:132). 
In 2006 Ali Zafar, a Macroeconomist at the World bank, wrote that 
“the ascent of China will inﬂuence the dynamics of Western aid to the 
continent and alter the landscape of development assistance. New working 
mechanisms between the lenders will have to be crafted. Moreover, the 
traditional donors and international ﬁnancial institutions will have to work 
creatively to bring the Chinese into the broader development platform.” 
(Zafar, 2007:126).  
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4 DAC Aid 
In order to shed some light on how DAC aid has changed, a 
description of their common goals and major areas of focus is 
presented below. This is followed by some data of how aid by sector 
has changed over time. 
4.1 DAC Official goals of aid 
The DAC-countries have worked with aid for decades, and their view of 
what the important elements of aid are, have inevitably changed over time. 
To add to this, DAC countries and their policies are very heterogeneous.  
The US is for example known to have directed a large share of its aid to 
areas that concern their national security, France works to promote and 
preserve French culture in its former colonies and Japan commonly tie 
demands of recipients purchasing Japanese goods or services to their aid. 
However, a common factor for most of the traditional donors is been to lift 
the importance of democracy, human rights, participation and environment 
issues (Odén, 2006:33f). Countries also agree that aid should be efficient, 
which is why several declarations on aid effectiveness have been prepared 
and signed regarding good governance (OECD
11
). The DAC countries claim 
that poverty reduction is, and should continue to be the main goals of aid 
(OECD
12
). They have simultaneously worked on a number of guidelines for 
aid, through forming a “best practice”. It is stated in these guidelines that 
democracy, good governance and low levels of corruption are essential to 
poverty reduction (Ljunggren, 1995:46).  
In 2000, the UN agreed on the Millennium Development Goals
6
, which 
since then have been an important determinant for DAC aid work 
(Mahmoud, 2007:51). The DAC countries have since signed a number of 
agreements that can help clear their positions on aid. The Paris declaration, 
                                                                                                                                      
 
6
 The Millennium Goals are: Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; Achieving universal 
primary education; 
Promoting gender equality and empowering women; reducing child mortality rates; improving 
maternal health; 
combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; ensuring environmental sustainability, and  
developing a global partnership for development (www.un.org) 
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signed in 2006, clearly states that it is desirable to avoid intrusive 
conditionalities, that is, the practice of donor countries interfering in 
recipients national politics in exchange for aid. Corruption and transparency, 
as well as failing recipient country institutions are also lifted as important 
(OECD
7, 
2006:4ff; OECD
9
). Furthermore, DAC claims to focus on good 
governance, human rights and democracy. Work on these issues should not 
be carried out through conditionalities, but rather by helping governments 
by assessments, strengthening of both institutions and NGOs (OECD
10
). 
In 2005, The OECD, and DAC, started the “Aid for Trade” program 
illustrating a stronger focus on the importance of trade for economic 
development. The initiative is aimed at helping developing countries 
overcome obstacles to trade and development and has been important to 
trade becoming a development strategy priority (OECD
3
). It is also 
important to keep in mind that aid that supports economic growth indirectly 
can promote democratization as a number of studies have shown that higher 
income levels may lead to a more democratic government (Falk, 1995:137).  
In recent years, DAC countries have strived to increase collaboration 
with other donors, and especially China. In 2009 the China-DAC study 
group was established in order to promote growth and increases poverty 
reduction in developing countries. The group serves as a means of 
communication between donors. The group highlights that good governance 
stable democracy are crucial aspects of African development (OECD
13
, 
2011). 
To summarize, the DAC as a whole has many explicit result-oriented 
goals where economic development is the most prominent. However, softer, 
non-economic goals such as good governance, human rights and anti-
corruption still take an important place in their collective aid agenda. 
Without further investigating individual countries policies this can be taken 
as evidence that these topics are important for DAC countries in general as 
they have all agreed on a more harmonized aid policy, which includes 
working towards common goals. Also, the important Paris declaration 
emphasizes on the importance of good governance, and since all DAC 
countries signed it they are assumed to agree with that statement.   
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Source: OECD
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ODA and other official flows to Africa South of Sahara have increased in 
absolute numbers since the 2000´s (Mahmoud, 2007:58f). This is illustrated 
by the figure above of gross ODA disbursements (OECD
4
). Aid share of 
total DAC GDP has also increased since 2000, from about 0.23% in 2002 to 
0.3% in 2011(Aidflows.org).  
DAC only keeps statistics over aid per sector and recipient country from 
2002, making the timespan a slight bit shorter than would be ideal. The 
following statistics still gives an image of the distribution of aid classified as 
“allocable7”. These sectors, or main purpose categories (e.g. health or 
education) defines the main categories which an activity intends to foster. 
These sector classifications includes a number of sub-categories that are not 
allocable by sector; general budget support; debt relief; humanitarian aid, 
emergency assistance; food aid; support to non-governmental organisations 
and administrative costs (OECD
5
) 
The share of aid directed to work on improving governance
8
 seem to 
have increased, from 5-6 percent of total ODA in the first half of the decade 
to 8-9 percent during the second half of the period (OECD
5
, authors 
calculations). This indicates that governance, democracy and anti-corruption 
work has become increasingly important since China increased its aid.  
                                                                                                                                      
 
7
 Category I includes aid to Education, Health, Sanitation, Governance, Human Rights, Anti-
Corruption, Gender equality. Category II includes aid to road and rail transport, Energy, Banking 
and Financial services, and  Privatization. Category III includes aid to Agriculture, Mining, 
Construction, and Trade policy and regulations.  
8
 The category of Government and Civil society includes work on Public Sector Management and  
Administration Management, Public Finance Management,  Decentralization and Support to Sub 
national Government, Anti-corruption Organisations and Institutions, Legal and Judicial 
Development, Democratic Participation and Civil Society, Elections, Legislators and Political 
Parties, Media and Free Flow of Information,  Human Rights, and Women‟s Equality Institutions 
and Organizations. 
Figure 1 DAC Aid to Africa South of Sahara 
Gross ODA Disbursements in Constant Prices 2011 
USD
1
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Figure 2 Sector Share of Total ODA Allocable 
 
 
Source: OECD
5
  
 
The figure above shows that Social Infrastructure and Services have become 
increasingly compared to the other three categories. All have grown though, 
with the exception of 2007 where the allocable sectors lost shares to other 
categories, manly that of costs for internal refugees that is not included in 
the figure (see Appendix A). Appendix B shows a table of the changes by 
all sectors, including budget support, humanitarian aid and administrative 
costs of aid. In order to examine how DAC-work has changed by regards to 
the sectors of governance, anti-corruption, and human rights further the 
components of sector I are compared to the total ODA given, showing how 
the share of aid to these three sectors have changed over time. 
 
 
 
 
¨ 
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Table 1 ODA  to South of Sahara in Millions USD  
Constant Prices 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total All Sectors 16583 23375 21978 28196 36108 24233 25539 27212 29056 31888 
I. Social 
Infrastructure & 
Services 
4547 5917 6438 6839 8497 9578 10955 12304 12864 12615 
I.1. Education 1434 1981 2000 1784 2081 2588 2439 2877 2911 2232 
I.2. Health 869 1049 1063 1205 1449 1342 1553 1879 1988 2156 
I.3. Population 
Pol./Program 
480 778 1100 1187 1657 2112 3055 3543 3613 3845 
I.4. Water Supply 
& Sanitation 
353 406 454 525 664 646 752 788 924 1065 
I.5. Government 
& Civil Society 
1052 1301 1388 1631 1979 2176 2408 2581 2749 2603 
I.6. Other Social 
Infrastruction 
358 400 430 504 664 711 747 636 676 711 
Source: OECD5 
 
As is evident from the table above, as well as the figure in Appendix C, 
there has been an absolute increase in aid directed to government and civil 
society programmes, from 2002 aid increased with 147%. Aid to 
government and civil society therefore seem to have become more important 
for DAC-countries since 2002. It also continues being relatively important 
in comparison to other sectors like health and water. An important 
explantation to this is that the amount of untied DAC-aid has gone up during 
this period, from 42% in 2001 to 82% in 2007 (OECD
14
). This however, 
does not take technical assistance and food aid into account , which makes 
the real percentage of untied aid somewhat lower than this (Musakwa, 
2013). However, there is still a trend towards untying aid, which implies 
that traditional donors lose a portion of influence over developing countries. 
Slowly phasing out conditionalities mean that old democracies, if they want 
to encourage a democratization or a certain political development need to 
find new ways. This then, creates a good explanation to why countries seem 
to invest increasing amounts in sectors promoting political change. 
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5 Analysis 
 
It is inherently problematic to answer the question on whether the increase 
in Chinese aid has changed DAC aid. It is problematic because of the 
uncertainties involved with determining causality; the ways in which DAC 
could be expected to move because of Chinese aid also is the way DAC has 
decided to change seemingly on their own accord. It is also difficult because 
of the lack of information about aid on sector-level, and last but not least, 
difficult because the heterogeneous group of DAC donors are not really 
stating why they are changing their priorities.  
However, it seems clear that OECD and DAC countries have been 
forced to take China into account, now more than ever. This is evident in the 
new forms of collaboration between the OECD/DAC and BRIC countries 
that have been initiated, and the sole fact that there is a DAC-China study 
group indicates that China, in particular, is a political force that needs to be 
taken into consideration.  
 Despite the discourse on harmful Chinese aid, it does have similarities 
with DAC aid. The DAC continuously discusses the importance of 
economic growth in order to reduce poverty in Africa South of Sahara. This 
can be done by means of investments in infrastructure, agriculture and the 
private sector, just as China is doing. The difference in this type of aid 
seems to lie more in the way that the aid work is executed. Whereas DAC 
tries to make its members give aid in the most transparent way possible to 
hinder corruption, information on Chinese aid is very inaccessible.  
On top of this is conditionality, DAC countries still tie aid to political 
reform to promote good governance and democracy to some extent. This is 
a highly contested practice, it risks to supersede national self-determination 
and it is not at all certain that DAC countries knows best when it comes to 
national policy in developing countries. China on the other hand renounces 
this practise, which may lessen incentives for African states to deepen their 
democratic development.  
Another reason for action is that Chinese aid is not directed to projects 
regarding human rights, good governance, democracy or anti-corruption 
work, which may mean they fall behind on the list of priorities which means 
development within these areas are not as efficient as it could be.  
With this background, it is reasonable to assume DAC-countries would 
focus more on aid dealing with the subjects that Chinese aid does not, both 
in order to make sure these questions do not lose priority and that the 
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development does not lose momentum, but also in order to assert their 
political power in the region. Chinese aid is more appealing thanks to its 
lack of conditionality and workers and experts are cheaper than those of 
traditional donors. Furthermore, China offers a great market potential for 
many African countries in terms of food and mining exports. So, it would 
make sense for DAC-donors to focus on something they do actually know 
more about than China, namely democracy and human rights. Because, 
regardless what the motivation for aid is, donors want to have an impact on 
the countries they work in. 
It does seem to be a weak trend of DAC countries moving Governance 
and Democracy up on the agenda, over time. This could be because it has 
become part of the political discourse that development within these fields 
are necessary for economic development; but it can also be a sign of DAC 
countries adapting to Chinese aid, trying to counterweight it and asserting 
their political power. To investigate further, and in more depth, the 
illustrative case of Zambia is presented below.  
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6 Zambia 
Overall China as a donor in Zambia cannot be ignored 
– Martyn Davies (2008:48). 
 
As one of the largest recipients of Chinese aid, Zambia is an interesting case 
for showing the effects of DAC aid of the increased donations from China. 
Chinas involvement in the Zambia has also been studied by numerous 
Western scholars since the mid-2000s, indicating that there is an important 
on-going development collaboration between the two (Hairong-Sautman, 
2013:1). 
The Zambian economy is heavily dependent on its copper resources; 
about 60 per cent of their export revenue comes from this single commodity 
(CIA, 2013). As of 2012, Switzerland is the single most important export 
partner of Zambia, China came in second, standing for approximately 20 per 
cent of total Zambian exports. (Trading Economics, 2013).  
Zambia has been a democracy since 1991, and is classified as 
“partly free” by the Freedom House index (CIA Fact book – Freedom 
House, 2012). Human rights conventions are ratified but not incorporated 
into domestic legislation. A US report on human rights accounts for serious 
human rights violations by means of abusive security forces, unlawful 
killings, torture and restrictions on freedom of speech, assembly, and 
association (Bureau of Human Rights, Democracy and Labour, 2012:4). 
NGOs have been able to operate relatively freely during the first half of the 
2000s, but in 2009 a new legislation was brought on, making work more 
difficult for them (Freedom House, 2013). Zambia is a country plagued by 
corruption. In 2012 it ranked as 88 out of 176 countries in Transparency 
Internationals index, scoring well below the global average. Ever since 
Transparency International started measuring corruption, Zambia has placed 
itself relatively high on the list of the most corrupt countries (Transparency 
International, 2012) 
Despite of Zambias natural resources, more than 60 per cent of the 
population lives under the poverty line, and in spite of recent years 
economic growth, the trend of unemployment and poverty does not seem to 
break. Zambia was classified a middle income country in 2011 despite 
having 80% of rural population living in extreme poverty, which indicates a 
skewed income distribution (OECD
11
). Zambia also has a very low HDI, 
scoring below the average of Sub Saharan Africa even though there has 
been an improvement over the last few years (UNDP, 2013).   
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Zambia is heavily dependent on aid. In 2009 no less than 20% of the 
annual budget came from foreign donors, this is share is decreasing, but 
improvement is relatively slow (Afrodad, 2012- OECD, 2011c: 14). This 
means changes in donor behaviour can be expected to have great impact on 
the country.  
6.1 Zambia and China  
The first high-profile Chinese aid project in Zambia was created as early as 
the 1970. The TAZARA railway between Tanzania and Zambia, a huge 
investment in infrastructure, marked the beginning of Chinese presence in 
the region. Today the railway is scarcely used, run down, and a source for 
up to 700 million in debt for maintenance to the Tanzanian and Zambian 
government. (French, 2010:3).  
In 1998, Zambia started deepening its collaboration with China once 
again as the Chinese made a 100 million USD investment in the copper 
mines there, for commercial purposes. China has since then increased its 
presence in Zambia by a remarkable pace just as it has in so many other 
African countries. (French, 2010:3). According to Davies, China provided 
about 240 million USD in aid to Zambia between 2000 and 2007. These 
numbers may be slightly skewed since they are based on interviews and 
newspaper articles, but can still be compared to the 372 million USD 
Zambia received from China between 1967, and 1996, showing on a 
remarkable increase in monetary flows (Davies, 2008:45ff). According to a 
report from the Zambian Finance and National Planning China moved from 
number 17 to 12 on the list of biggest donors to Zambia from 2006 to 2009. 
China also accounted for no less than 35% of the loans Zambia received 
(OECD, 2011c:14). Not only is Chinese aid in Zambia picked up 
considerably after the year 2000, but also that China is a considerable aid 
donor in the country (albeit still much smaller than the Paris club donors.). 
The OECD report also states that the emergence of new donors, such as the 
BRIC has affected the aid architecture in Zambia since 2005. Its real impact 
though, is problematic to measure as Chinese aid often is off-budget, i.e. not 
disbursed through government systems (OECD, 2011c:4) 
The vast majority of Chinese donations are aimed directed towards 
economic projects involving China, or is aimed at promoting Chinese 
companies. Therefore, to track some of the consequences of Chinese aid, we 
have to look at what is happening in the private sector. Foreign direct 
investment from China to Zambia has increased from 100 million USD in 
2000 to 2.8 billion in 2012, and China is now amongst the top three FDI 
providers in Zambia. This makes Zambia the third largest recipient of 
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Chinese FDI in the world which is generally explained by Zambia‟s great 
production of copper (Redvers, 2011).  
At the symbolically important 2006 FOCAC meeting, China proclaimed 
a $3 million debt write-off, and promised to build hospitals, schools and 
anti-malaria centres in Zambia. President Hu Jintao´s also signed a joint 
communiqué where both countries agreed that cooperation would focus on 
infrastructure, agriculture, mining and human resources development and 
expanded cooperation in culture, education, health, tourism and aviation. 
They also agreed to establish yet another Special Economic Zone (SEZ) the 
following year (Davies, 2008). 
Chinas first SEZ was established in copper rich Chambishi region in the 
year 2000. Firms located in the zone get duty waivers and tax reduction in 
order to promote investment and economic growth. Over the years more 
SEZs were established, and in 2007 after the FOCAC meeting, China 
committed to provide 800 million USD worth of investment credit for 
Chinese companies in the newly established region
9
 (Davies, 2008). 
Beijing supports Chinese companies´ investments in the mineral, 
agricultural, manufacturing sectors, and has continues meetings with 
Zambian leaders to promote more favourable conditions for Chinese 
businesses in the country. At the same time, social responsibility is 
encouraged in order to promote Zambian development (China Daily, 
2013) Generally, Chinese investment in Zambia has been focused on mining 
precious metals rather than development. However, some aid is given 
unconditionally to Zambia, enabling the government themselves to make 
investments in poverty reduction projects (Afrodad , 2012:13). 
 
 5.2 Effects of Chinese Aid in Zambia 
 
Despite the long-going collaboration between China and Zambia, Michel 
Sata, leader of the Patriotic Front Party, made the Chinese presence a hot 
election question in 2006. They argued for Zambian limitation of Chinese 
influence, saying it lowered Zambian wages and corrupted politicians. Sata 
won 28 per cent of the votes in the 2006 election and 38 per cent in the 2008 
election (French, 2010:66). China reacted by threatening to break contact 
with Zambia if Sata and his party won, and there were numerous allegations 
of opaque funding to the China-friendly ruling party, MMD (Redvers, 
2011). When Sata won the presidential elections in 2011 China‟s threat was 
never realized, instead ties between the two countries have become 
increasingly stronger. In 2013 President Sata stated that that China is an 
                                                                                                                                      
 
9
 The main investment in the zone is a 250 million USD copper smelter and in 2007 EXIM bank 
granted a 208 million USD concessional loan for construction of the plant infrastructure. 
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important partner in development that brings a large amount of jobs to 
Zambia (China Daily).  
An OECD report from 2012 lifts the question of corruption as it reports 
that China has used “soft loans” and “other practices” to secure contracts for 
copper findings. The OECD considers this a “very important” driver of 
corruption. There have been several allegations of China providing 
financing to political parties. Further, foreign business bribery is very much 
contributing to the Zambian corruption, especially in the mining industry, 
where China is particularly active. Since China is working so extensively to 
promote their own companies in Zambia, the government can be seen to 
play a role in the culture of corruption in Zambia, particularly so because of 
China´s hands-off policy when it comes to governance. This means China 
may indirectly contribute to the corruption, but not to the solution of it 
(OECD
11
 p.76ff). There are indications of some of the Chinese practices 
promoting corruption. That does not necessarily mean that Chinese aid leads 
to corruption directly, but since aid and commercial interests go hand in 
hand, it may do so indirectly.  
Zambia has reportedly asked China for help in internet surveillance and 
censorship equipment in 2013. Sources are anonymous and details 
unconfirmed, so this should be taken with caution, but this goes in line with 
the trend of increased intimidation and legal harassment against the 
country‟s opposition (Freedom House2) 
However, Martyn Davies reports that several government department 
representatives state that China is seen as a good development partner as 
traditional aid is not consistently provided. To fill the gap, the government 
turns to China for help (Davies, 2008). Yan Hairong and Barry Sautman 
writes that Western politicians and media have spread a negative discourse 
about Chinese and Zambian cooperation, particularly since the 2006 
FOCAC meeting (Hairong-Sautman, 2013:131ff).  
Today, China is not only a supplier of aid to Zambia, but also a 
stakeholder in the Zambian economy, owning mines and other businesses in 
communication and construction (Negi, 2008). Human Rights Watch 
reported about labour abuses in mines in 2011 such as unsafe working 
conditions, resistance to unions, disregarding to Zambian law, and lower 
pay than what is normal for a Zambian mine (Freedom House
3
). 
Further, the Zambian government writes that China does not seem to be 
recognizing the principles of the Paris Declaration, nor are they part of the 
dialogue to improve aid effectiveness (OECD, 2011c:14) 
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6.2 AID from DAC  
Zambia is a large recipient of DAC aid, about 700 million USD was 
transferred there in 2011. About 61% of that is contributed by the top five 
donors (USA, UK, Norway, Japan, and Denmark). DAC aid has increased 
since 2000, with the exception of 2010 where aid disbursements declined 
because of alleged corruption scandals which resulted in the suspension of 
aid to some important sectors (OECD, 2011b:1). A large portion of DAC aid 
to Zambia is untied but also that some non-DAC donors frequently require 
the use of goods and services from their respective countries when providing 
grants to Zambia. It is however not clear what countries they suggest use 
this practise frequently (OECD, 2011b:11). 
 A 2011 working paper shows that the three most important 
influences on aid relations since 2005 have been the write-off of debts from 
the world bank, the withholding of funds after alleged misappropriation of 
funds at the ministry of health, and, the rising influence of China. The 
influence of China is, according to the OECD, is influential since it is not a 
part of the aid effectiveness agenda, and because aid is mostly given in form 
of loans (OECD, 2011c:ix). Chinas growing influence, in combination with 
the fact that the world bank now is far less involved in Zambia, means that 
traditional donors influence relative to new ones has seen a decrease.  
 During the rule of President Levy Mwanawasa, some work against 
corruption was initiated, but corruption caught speed again in 2008 when he 
died. This eventually caused a number of DAC donors to suspend part of the 
aid donations to Zambia. President Banda responded in June 2010 by 
accusing donors of interfering in Zambia‟s internal affairs and stated “we 
did not ask anyone to fund the road sector or the health sector, so they must 
not use that as blackmail," However, donors continue supporting anti-
corruption work in the country, giving assistance both to state agencies and 
civil society groups (Freedom House
3
). Furthermore, DAC donors 
supported the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in 2010, trying 
to make the mining sector more transparent. This is seen as a particularly 
important sector as there are serious concern over mineral exploitation, 
where prices have soared without generating very much profit trough 
royalties or taxation. (Freedom House 
4
, 2011) 
The EU as well as the British High Commission have pushed for a more 
extensive dialogue with China regarding Zambian aid. It is perceived that 
China will increasingly align itself to the global consensus on aid, especially 
in terms of governance (Davies, 2008).  
However, it is not only Chinese aid that is criticised in Zambia, Dambisa 
Moyo, a London based, Zambian, economist writes about what she calls the 
West‟s “obsession with democracy” and explains how aid is truly harmful 
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as it encourages wasteful economic policy and prevents the middle class 
from growing. A middle class that is necessary for a stable democratic 
development. (French, 2010:4) 
 As illustrated in the figure below, DAC aid to Zambia was decreasing 
during a large part of the 1990´s, a trend that was partly broken in 1999 and 
continued upward in the 2000´s. Despite a decrease in aid during the last 
couple of years aid is still slightly above the levels of aid 20 years ago. DAC 
aid did increase in 1999, just after China made a large investment in 
Zambian mines and continued increasing for a large part of the 2000s. This 
may be an indicator of that Chinese aid affects DAC, but it could also mean 
that Zambia became a more interesting partner country as copper prices rose 
The decrease in aid in since 2007 may partly be explained by the financial 
crises in the DAC countries, but also suggests that Chinese influence is not 
that important as Chinese aid has increased since 2000. If it were an 
influential factor in aid allocation DAC aid should continue increasing aid to 
Zambia throughout the 2000s.  
 
 
Figure 3 
 
Source: OECD
5 
 
 
As previously mentioned, DAC data on aid by sector and country only dates 
back to 2002, which is slightly problematic for investigating the causality 
and consequences of Chinese aid. However, it does show the trend during 
the past ten years. Looking at the share of aid directed at Government and 
Civil Society projects, there is a general upward trend from 2002. Sector 
Allocable Aid, of which this sector is a part, has generally got an 
increasingly large share of ODA since 2002. ODA directed to Government 
and Civil Society as a part of total aid has behaved in a similar fashion to 
that of Allocable Aid.   
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Figure 4 
 
Source: OECD
5
 
 
The sector of Governance and Civil society contains, as previously mentioned, 
many categories such as infrastructure and education, but the part that has seen the 
largest increase since 2002 is that dealing with population. The sector that 
specifically deals with governance and civil society has also received more 
funding, it has more than doubled since 2002, from 31 to 65 million dollars, and 
its share of sector allocable aid has also increased. However, it does seem to have 
reacted as predicted, somewhat lifting focus on governance, democracy and anti-
corruption. In order to draw clearer conclusions about the changes in aid, more 
detailed country data would be necessary.  
      The table of Appendix D shows how total ODA disbursements have 
developed over time, per sector. It is clear that sector I, Social infrastructure and 
Services, is a very important destination for development assistance. It has gone 
from making up 45% of total ODA to 65% in 2011. Support to democracy, 
governance, human rights and corruption fighting, are included in this category. 
However, as shown in the picture of Appendix F, it makes up a very modest part 
of aid. It is also well below the share of what Government and Civil Society 
receive out of aid to Africa as a whole. Instead, in Zambia aid is directed quite 
evenly across the Social Infrastructure and Services, with an exception of 
Population and Reproductive health programmes, which receives far more 
funding than any of the other categories. Education and health are still relatively 
prioritized despite the fact that they have received less substantially less funding 
the last two years.  
In conclusion, despite the fact that aid towards governance and democracy 
has doubled since the beginning of the millennia, the relative share of aid directed 
there have increased little. The increase is still evident though, and even if its not a 
dramatic change, it at least shows that DAC aid has not decreased when Chinese 
aid has increased. 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
P
e
rc
e
n
t
Government and Civil Society´s Share 
of Total ODA Sector Allocable 
(Percent)
  30 
7 Conclusion 
Just as in Africa South of Sahara, aid in Zambia has changed, if only 
modestly, to a heavier focus on governance, corruption, democracy 
and human rights.  
Zambia is a country rich in natural resources, with a relatively 
stable political system, and in desperate need of investment and 
development assistance. This should make it an ideal country to give 
aid to, as there is much to win and relatively good conditions for aid to 
reach the intended projects.   
China has had a clear influence on Zambia over the past decade, 
both politically and economically thanks to investment and 
development assistance. China has without doubt brought much good 
to Zambia, but its presence does not seem to be without problems. 
China trying to affect the outcome of a democratic election by heavy 
party funding and threats of aid and investment withdrawal, and 
corruption controversies are only one example of that.  
The DAC seem to have good incentives to act to increase their 
influence in Zambia. Aid has certainly increased in general, and 
sectors supporting governance and democracy have also received 
more funding as Chinese influence has increased. However, its 
importance relative to other aid sectors have only increased 
marginally since the beginning of the millennia. Considering there 
seemed to be such good preconditions for DAC aid to exhibit a change 
in aid patterns in Zambia, it seems unlikely that it would show more in 
other places.  
The small increase that has in fact happened can be explained by 
the common perception that China is negative for the development of 
good governance and democracy in Zambia. For DAC countries to 
avoid losing political influence, and risk their previous work to be 
reversed they would have to place a larger focus on these issues. 
On the other hand, as China does not, at least on an official level, 
interfere with national policies, meaning DAC countries still operate 
relatively undisturbed with aid directed towards democracy, 
corruption, human rights and governance. This could be an 
explanation to why not even more attention has been given to 
democracy and governance in general. There are other aid sectors 
where China has become a viable player, and perhaps it becomes 
increasingly important to be strong on the type of economy 
developing aid that China focuses on. Focus on economy also goes 
hand in hand with DAC´s own goals of aid, meaning there is no 
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certain a causation effect here, but rather a correlation between DAC 
countries increased focus on economy and Chinese focus on the same. 
Focus on economy and focus on governance are two effects that could 
work against each other, perhaps decreasing the viable change in DAC 
aid.  
Furthermore, the Zambian government does not seem to always 
welcome DAC ideas with open arms. As the Zambian government can 
get assistance from an alternative source it is easier to question DAC 
ideals about, for example, democracy and good governance. Chinese 
aid, then, can be used as leverage against traditional donors, implying 
they are losing influence. The fact that aid continues to increase to 
Africa South of Sahara, as well as Zambia may not be a coincidence. 
Apart from filling a need amongst the world´s poorest, it may also be 
a way for the traditional great powers to stand their ground and defend 
their values and interests. 
In conclusion, aid promotion of democracy, good governance, 
human rights, and anti-corruption work has increased somewhat, both 
in Africa South of Sahara in general, and Zambia in particular. This 
means that DAC does not seem to have shifted focus completely 
towards aid promoting trade and economic development as China has 
become a stronger actor in the region. It also means governance and 
democracy keeps their priority in DAC aid policy. It is difficult to say 
that this small shift is caused entirely by Chinese aid to the region, 
since DACs own policy has also changed. However, looking at the 
new-established connections between new and old donors, it seem 
very probable that the aid donors would take China into consideration 
when making aid policies. Further, there seem to be a general caution 
about Chinas increased economic and political influence in the region, 
which could decrease old donors relative influence. If aid is given in 
order to gain influence, DAC would have to react for them to act in 
some way, and keeping or increasing aid towards sectors 
strengthening governance can be such a way.  
To be able to draw more certain conclusions on how DAC aid is 
affected by China, a quantitative study would be needed. This would 
allow for a conclusion on whether the small change found in Zambia 
occurs systematically, over years and countries. It would also be 
interesting to investigate general trend changes in DAC aid, not only 
what has happened to democracy, human rights, governance and anti-
corruption, but also aid connected to trade, agriculture and production. 
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9 Appendix 
Appendix A 
 
Source: OECD 5 
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Appendix B 
Total ODA from DAC-Donors to Countries South of Sahara in 
Million Dollars 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total All Sectors 16583 23375 21978 28197 36108 24233 25540 27213 29057 29056 
I. Social 
Infrastructure & 
Services, Total 
4548 5917 6439 6840 8497 9578 10956 12304 12864 12864 
II. Economic 
Infrastructure & 
Services, Total 
826 911 926 995 1003 1431 1598 1737 2037 2037 
III. Production 
Sectors, Total 
822 898 818 855 980 1271 1172 1372 2057 2057 
IV. Multi-Sector 
/ Cross-Cutting, 
Total 
866 1073 1005 984 1225 1190 1118 1206 1441 1441 
VI. Commodity 
Aid / General 
Prog. Ass., Total 
1515 1461 1480 1556 2145 2215 2680 2613 2634 2634 
VII. Action 
Relating to Debt, 
Total 
4780 9260 7275 11953 18212 4756 3010 3113 4013 4013 
VIII. 
Humanitarian 
Aid, Total 
1472 2787 2911 3805 3653 3291 4531 4457 3384 3383 
IX. 
Administrative 
Costs of Donors, 
Total 
29 35 70 88 89 94 119 130 156 155 
XI. Refugees in 
Donor 
Countries, Total 
162 100 372 332 74 157 189 130 162 162 
XII. Unallocated 
/ Unspecified, 
Total 
1564 932 683 789 229 250 167 151 309 309 
Total flows= Public and Private flows. Public spending data was only available from 2004.  
Gross disbursments = actual transactions and not only agreements 
  
Source: OECD 5 
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Appendix C 
 
Source: OECD 5 
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Appendix D 
 
Government & Civil Society´s 
Share of Total ODA From 
DAC to Africa South of Sahara 
2002  4,9% 
2003  4,5% 
2004  5,4% 
2005  4,8% 
2006  4,5% 
2007  6,9% 
2008  7,1% 
2009  7,1% 
2010  7,5% 
2011  6,3% 
Source: OECD 5 
 
Appendix E 
Government and Civil 
Society´s Share of Total 
ODA to Zambia 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
7% 
8% 
5% 
2% 
4% 
9% 
9% 
8% 
9% 
9% 
Source: OECD 5 
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Appendix F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD 5 
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Appendix G 
Total Government and Civil Society 
ODA to Zambia 
2002 31,21376 
2003 34,57445 
2004 39,15067 
2005 42,22063 
2006 51,63047 
2007 66,83854 
2008 67,77377 
2009 57,21906 
2010 57,61982 
2011 64,69131 
Source: OECD 5 
Appendix H  
 
DAC Sector Allocable ODA to Zambia in Million USD (Constant Prices) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
I. Social Infrastructure & 
Services, Total 
208,5 293,9 322,5 360,8 397,2 438,9 469,9 460,4 386,1 458,1 
II. Economic 
Infrastructure & Services, 
Total 
61,7 58,1 30,7 24,9 41,6 22,9 23,9 36,9 49,3 80,6 
III. Production Sectors, 
Total 
48,7 
21,02
831 
19,03
707 
36,32
333 
45,44
89 
48,80
021 
49,46
964 
48,70
035 
38,63
17 
43,76
087 
IV. Multi-Sector / Cross-
Cutting, Total 
29,3 38,1 38,2 14,3 22,4 24,9 26,7 23,3 22,9 28,8 
VI. Commodity Aid / 
General Prog. Ass., Total 
17,5 4,2 10,6 52,4 90,9 122,2 139,5 139,3 125,2 86,30 
VII. Action Relating to 
Debt, Total 
50,5 320,0 399,7 
1182,
4 
819,4 90,3 0,6 7,2 0,2 0,2 
VIII. Humanitarian Aid, 
Total 
21,4 17,2 9,9 16,7 9,2 10,8 14,3 13,4 3,1 2,1 
IX. Administrative Costs 
of Donors, Total 
0,4 0,1 1 1,2 2,9 2 2,2 4,9 4,9 4,4 
XII. Unallocated / 
Unspecified, Total 
25,9 16,7 13,1 19,9 2,9 4,6 4,4 4,2 0,9 0,9 
Total Allocable 348,1 411,1 410,4 436,3 506,8 535,5 569,9 569,3 496,9 611,3 
Source OECD5 
  
